We present an economy composed of many sectors. In each sector, a simple dynamic stochastic game is played between a wage-setting union and many competitive firms that choose employment. Firms are subject to linear workforce adjustment costs whilst the union, along with employment and wages, is also concerned with limiting the number of insiders fired during business downturns.
Introduction
Employment protection legislation (Epl) has long been blamed for the high unemployment rate in Europe. Theoretical research, however, has struggled to find a strong argument supporting this view. In fact, early models of dynamic labor demand (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990) as well as the more recent search and matching literature (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001) come to the conclusion that Epl would only reduce workforce turnover with no clear e ect on employment levels.
Employment stabilization underscores what is by now a common opinion regarding the main objective of Epl. According to this opinion, Epl is a substitute for missing private insurance markets. By restricting the number of workers involved in workforce dismissals, employment protection imposes a constraint on firms and hinders their e ciency. It is also true, however, that employment protection reduces the risk of being fired for individuals that are risk averse and unable to find an insurer. Thus, provided that Epl is appropriately designed and calibrated, an overall increase in welfare may result (Bertola, 2004; Pissarides, 2001) .
The view of Epl as a substitute for insurance, however, is seriously challenged by some aggregate cross-country evidence whereby the risk of being fired -loosely captured by a measure of aggregate job turnover -does not appear to be linked to institutional adjustment costs. More specifically, once OECD countries are ranked on the basis of the stringency of Epl, no clear pattern emerges between the position within the rank and the job turnover rate (OECD, 1996) . Of course, data may not be very reliable. Furthermore, conditioning on composition e ects that are country specific may help to reconcile theory with observations. More fundamentally, however, theory may fail to capture some other aspects of reality that are relevant for turnover decisions. Bertola and Rogerson (1997) provide an initial attempt to improve the descriptive performance of models of dynamic labor demand. They notice that, at least for five large countries, the stringency of Epl provisions is positively correlated with the degree of centralization in wage bargaining. This implies that wage elasticity to firm idiosyncratic conditions is low in countries with strict Epl and high in countries with mild Epl. Therefore, in countries with mild Epl, wages adjust to bad idiosyncratic shocks so that firms do not need to fire very much even if firing is not costly. By contrast, in countries with strict Epl, wages hardly adjust to bad idiosyncratic conditions so that firms would like to shed labor at high rates. In these countries, however, firing is costly with the result that firms refrain from firing much. Thus, the combination of institutional arrangements having opposite e ects on workforce adjustments explains the surprising homogeneity of turnover rates despite wide di erences in Epl.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the explanation of the apparent irrelevance of Epl for turnover rates by o ering an additional perspective. We argue that current models of dynamic labor demand fail to capture an important aspect characterizing employment relationships. In particular, because wages in these models are assumed to be exogenous, workers are by assumption deprived of any active role in a ecting turnover decisions. Yet, in the real world, employees organize more or less formally in unions and bargain with firms not only over wages but also over their retention in case of worsening business conditions. Thus, even in the absence of Epl, workers might be able to reduce the risk of being dismissed by setting wages that are su ciently responsive to business conditions. Of course, endogenous wages do not prevent Epl provisions from contributing to the goal of employment stability. The marginal e ect of stricter Epl, however, is smaller than one would expect in a world where wages are exogenous or retention valueless.
In the paper, we study a dynamic game where a monopoly union sets the wage and many competitive firms choose the level of employment. All firms belong to the same industry whilst the union controls the whole labor supply in the industry. Firms are subject to costly workforce adjustments and to changes in technology and demand conditions in the form of a stochastic cycle of good and bad business states. As for the union, we assume that it aims at two distinct objectives. On the one hand the union aims at maximizing monopoly rents, on the other hand it aims at preserving the occupation of those who happen to be employed. In a stable economic environment, reaching these two goals simultaneously would be an easy task. However, with stochastic business conditions, a trade-o arises because setting wages which maximize rents at each point in time generates excessive turnover and deteriorates performance on retention. Thus, the optimal strategy for the union is to sacrifice some current rents in exchange for more employment stability. This leads to an overreaction of wages with respect to changes in business conditions. In particular, in bad times the union seeks to contain the number of dismissals and, for this reason, sets wages that are too low for rent optimization. By contrast, in good times the union seeks to contain the number of recruits or, more importantly, the number of future dismissals and sets wages that are too high for rent optimization.
As Epl becomes more severe, firms are subject to a greater incentive to reduce turnover on their own, i.e. for any given wage policy. From the point of view of the union, this implies an improvement in the dynamic trade-o between rents and retention so that the optimal wage policy becomes less sen-sitive to cyclical conditions. In turn, lower wage flexibility counteracts the e ect of stricter Epl on employment stability. The final outcome is that workforce fluctuations do not dampen by as much as they would if wages were exogenous, i.e. if workers were not concerned with their retention or were unable to control their wages. In this sense, the model contributes to explaining the apparent irrelevance of Epl for turnover rates as well as the negative empirical correlation between Epl and idiosyncratic wage elasticity. Preference for retention and union control over wages account for the evidence without resorting to arguments based on other sources of institutional heterogeneity among countries. This represents the main finding of the paper.
A further distinct result of the model is that the improvement in the dynamic trade-o increases the welfare of the union and provides a rationale for its political support to Epl provisions. In this respect, the paper is linked to the recent contribution by Modesto and Thomas (2001) where the union benefits from Epl as adjustment costs reduce the elasticity of labor demand. The two papers, however, di er in their focus as well as in some basic assumptions. Modesto and Thomas are concerned with the return for the union from committing to a given wage sequence and study this issue in a deterministic setting with quadratic adjustment costs. Here, we focus on workforce turnover and, for this reason, use a stochastic setting. Further, in light of the empirical rejection of quadratic costs (Hamermesh, 1989; Caballero et al. 1997) we assume that adjustment costs are linear.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the intra-industry firmsunion game is set up and the equilibrium is characterized under a fairly general revenue function. In section 3, equilibrium strategies are computed assuming a linear revenue function. Section 4 extends results to an economy composed of many identical industries and studies interactions between Epl and the preference for retention in a ecting aggregate turnover rates and wage dynamics. Section 5 discusses assumptions and provides some assessment on the empirical predictions of the model. Section 6 o ers some concluding remarks. Propositions are proved in a final appendix.
2 A wage-employment game
Overview
We assume that in any given industry a single union faces a unit mass of identical firms. Firms are competitive and labor is the only input required in production. Each firm maximizes the present discounted value of a cash flow given by the di erence between current revenues and labor costs:
Revenues R( t , l t ) depend on the level of employment l t and on a shifter t which summarizes business conditions, that is demand and productivity conditions. We assume that business conditions are the same for all firms in the industry. Costs are given by the wage bill w t l t plus workforce adjustment expenses. F and H represent respectively the total cost from firing and hiring a single worker. Thus, they are multiplied by the change in workforce. The indicator I lt<l t 1 switches from 0 to 1 if current employment becomes strictly lower than past employment. An analogous interpretation holds for the indicator I lt>l t 1 .
In general, employment protection can be interpreted as all those "restrictions placed on the ability of the employer to utilize labor" (Addison and Teixeira, 2001) . In practice, the main elements of such protection may be classified either as pure transfers -this is the case of severance paymentsor as rules imposing resource costs to the firm with no benefit for dismissed workers. Procedural inconveniences and advance notice obligations represent two examples of this second category. Since the transfer component can be undone by contractual arrangements (Lazear, 1990) , the literature concerned with workforce adjustment costs has almost exclusively focused upon the deadweight component. In this paper we follow this tradition and interpret F (H) as the amount of resources that the firm pays to a third party in exchange for the right to fire (hire) a worker. No fraction of F (H) is rebated to the fired (hired) worker.
We assume that the marginal productivity of labor is decreasing, R l > 0 and R ll < 0, and that revenues and marginal revenues increase with respect to business conditions, R > 0 and R l > 0. We also assume that the shifter moves between two values, g in good times and b (< g ) in bad times. The cycle is stochastic; if business conditions are currently good, the probability of reverting to the bad state in the next period is given by p, 1 p gives the probability for the state to remain good. Parameter q represents the probability of reverse transitions from the bad to the good state whilst 1 q indexes the degree of persistence in the bad state.
The union maximizes a discounted payo flow whose current component u t results from the sum of two terms:
The first term is traditional in static union models as it represents monopoly rents given by the aggregate number of employed workers L t multiplied by the di erence between the wage charged by the union w t and some exogenous reference wage w t . The second term refines a functional form which has been frequently used in the insider-outsider literature to convey aversion towards any distance between actual employment and union membership (Blanchard and Summers, 1986) . When, as in the present context, current membership is also assumed to be equal to lagged employment, this term implies aversion towards any employment change, no matter whether this change represents an increase or a reduction (Lockwood and Philippopoulos, 1994 ). The refinement is carried out by using the indicator I Lt<L t 1 which restricts aversion only to workforce reductions. Finally, parameter gives the relative weight of the two targets, rent maximization and employment retention.
The motivations behind this objective function are the following. First, it is crucial for the main idea of the paper to use an objective function embedding some preference for employment stability. This has been done by using the quadratic term. Second, using the quadratic term alone would expose the model to a couple of obvious objections. The first objection is that, with the quadratic term alone, the wage and employment levels would not be of any concern for the union. The second objection has already been discussed; without the indicator I Lt<L t 1 the union would also experience disutility from workforce additions.
1 Thus, the function above introduces a preference for employment stability while preserving the union traditional objectives that appear compelling due to their plausibility. Finally, we conclude the description of union objectives by noticing that indi erence curves exhibit the insideroutsider property discussed in Carruth and Oswald (1987) . The slope of these curves decreases by a discrete amount as current employment becomes higher than its past level.
We allow reference wages to move stochastically according to business conditions. Thus, w g and w b , with w b w g , represent reference wages respectively 1 Sanfey (1995) criticizes the objective function U = (n m) 2 [n: current employment, m: current membership] used in Blanchard and Summers: ".... it is unlikely that deviations of employment from membership are symmetric in their e ects on the union" (pag. 259).
with good and bad business conditions. This assumption is made for its empirical appeal alone and will be used later to compute the solution, a constant reference wage could also be fitted into the model with no relevant change.
The sequence of moves is the following. At the beginning of each period, nature reveals the state of business conditions, then the union sets the wage and, finally, any firm chooses its own employment level.
2 The game is solved by adopting the notion of Markov-perfect equilibrium (Maskin and Tirole, 1988) . This requires identifying a wage strategy and an employment strategy where current decisions are made contingent only on current state variables. In equilibrium, these strategies are mutual best responses and deviations never take place.
Assumptions on the dynamics of business conditions and reference wages describe a stochastic but time-stationary environment for both types of agents. This implies that calendar time does not represent a state variable. Since the union is only concerned with aggregate variables and since all firms are equal, current business conditions and lagged aggregate employment are su cient to describe the state of the game from the point of view of the union. By contrast, due to workforce adjustment costs, for any single firm the state of the game also includes its own level of lagged employment.
Employment policy
The aim of this sub-section is to solve the problem for a single representative firm by identifying the optimal employment policy given that the union adopts the wage policy w(j, L t 1 ), j = g, b. In principle, both the employment policy and the value of the firm should be made contingent on three relevant state variables: current business conditions, lagged own employment and lagged aggregate employment. Yet, the wage policy adopted by the union states that, for given business conditions, current wages represent a su cient statistic for 2 Do these assumptions imply that wages are time-contingent or state-contingent? Wages are set at the beginning of each fixed-length period and, in this sense, they are timecontingent. On the other hand, wages are also always state-contingent as business conditions are revealed an instant before the union moves.
In principle, to assess whether state-contingent wages are plausible one should ask whether in the real world spells of constant business conditions are significantly more durable than wage contracts. If this is true, in fact, wages would be contingent on current business conditions for most of the time.
In table 1 section 5, we report some econometric evidence showing that the elasticity of wages to a measure of idiosyncratic business conditions is positive. We regard this evidence as consistent with the fact that the duration of wage contracts is on average lower than that of spells of constant business conditions. aggregate lagged employment. Thus, we can safely use notation l(j, l t 1 , w t ) for the optimal employment policy and V (j, l t 1 , w t ) for the value of the firm obtained along this policy. Below we report the Bellman equation for the value of the firm:
The current state of business conditions is indexed with j, the opposite state with j 1 ; s j represents the probability of moving from the business state j to the business state j 1 , that is s g = p and s b = q. To shorten the notation we also use l 0 in substitution of the fully specified policy variable l(j, l t 1 , w t ) The value of the firm is given by the current cash-flow plus the expected discounted continuation value. The latter depends on the current employment choice l 0 , on next period wages, and on next period business conditions, which may change with probability s j or persist in state j with probability 1 s j . Notice finally that, since firms are small compared to the industry, current and future wages are regarded as being exogenous.
Before analyzing the optimal hiring and firing policy we need to define the shadow value of an extra worker permanently added to the workforce. Let the triple (j, l t 1 , w t ) represent the current state, the shadow value S (j, l t 1 , w t ) is defined as the variation in the value of the firm following a marginal upward shift in the employment path from time t 1 onwards. This marginal shift is computed along the optimal employment policy. According to the envelope theorem, this implies that the shadow value coincides with the derivative of V (j, l t 1 , w t ) with respect to l t 1 , that is the shadow value also represents the value of an extra worker added to the workforce at the beginning of period t.
We compute S by di erentiating V with respect to l t 1 and bearing in mind that a marginal increase in l t 1 is accompanied by an equal increase in l 0 . This procedure allows us to express the shadow value in recursive form:
Thus, the current shadow value turns out to be given by the di erence between the marginal revenue and the wage plus the future expected discounted shadow value.
If S is positive, the firm gains by adding new workers to the workforce and it would certainly do so if this addition could be done at no cost. On the other hand, if S is negative the firm gains from firing and it would certainly fire if this could be done at no cost. However, due to the corresponding costs, firing or hiring may not take place. The optimal employment policy can therefore be characterized as follows. If, under inaction, i.e. with l 0 = l t 1 , the shadow value is contained within the closed interval [ F, H] then inaction is optimal in the sense that hiring or firing an extra worker leads to a benefit which is equal or below the corresponding cost. By contrast, if under inaction the shadow value falls above H (below F ) hiring (firing) is optimal and the firm recruits (dismiss) workers until the shadow value becomes equal to H ( F ).
We close this section by noticing that the optimal policy implies that the shadow value S(j, l t 1 , w t ) does not increase with respect to l t 1 :
Equation 2 is true for the following two reasons. First, by running forward equation 1, one finds that the shadow value S(j, l t 1 , w t ) is given by the discounted expected flow of marginal productivity net of wages. Second, the optimal policy implies that the path of employment from time t onwards is not decreasing with respect to l t 1 . Thus, since R ll < 0 the value of marginal productivity net of wages at any time from period t onwards does not increase with respect to l t 1 .
Wage policy and equilibrium
We now characterize the optimal wage policy w(j, L t 1 ) and, more generally, the equilibrium path, by means of a set of formal results. Let W (j, L t 1 ) represent the discounted union welfare in the corresponding state and w 0 [= w(j, L t 1 )] the current policy variable, the relevant Bellman equation is the following:
Unions maximize their welfare under a traditional labor demand constraint. In particular, since firms are identical and represent a unit mass, the union is faced with an aggregate labor demand which is similar to the one that holds for any single firm.
In static monopoly models, the union has an incentive to increase the wage until the marginal cost in terms of lower employment becomes equal to the marginal benefit. The di erence in the present context is that employment is a state variable in a game where agents play Markov strategies. Thus, changing current employment also means changing the state of the game and, as a consequence, the future equilibrium path of employment and wages. Optimality thus requires a balance between the benefits from a higher wage and the costs that follow from the change in the equilibrium path. In the appendix we study the union policy and prove the following three results.
Result 1
The equilibrium wage policy is such that: a) the shadow value of labor either lies on the hiring barrier [S=H] or on the firing barrier [S=-F] (corollary 1); b) the shadow value lies on the firing barrier if employment does not change from the previous level (proposition 1); c) if the shadow value of labor lies on the hiring barrier in a given period, it moves to the firing barrier in the next period if business conditions do not change (proposition 2); d) if the shadow value of labor lies on the firing barrier in a given period, it lies on the firing barrier in the next period as well if business conditions do not change (proposition 3).
Pooling together these propositions, one concludes that the shadow value may lie on the hiring barrier only in the first period of a spell of constant business conditions. In all other cases, the value lies on the firing barrier. The intuition is that the union behaves as a monopolist and tends to push firms onto the firing barrier by imposing high wages most of the time. It is true, however, that the employment policy is forward looking and there might be gains for the union in terms of higher employment from committing to wage moderation and, henceforth, from keeping the shadow value of labor away from the firing barrier. Yet, this kind of commitment is ruled out by construction in a game where agents play state contingent strategies. More specifically, in equilibrium the shadow value cannot be internal to the open interval ( F, H) as this would imply non-optimal behavior on the part of the union. In this case, in fact, the union could safely increase the wage by a small amount without a ecting the current employment level and, as the latter is a state variable in The upshot of result 1 is that only two equilibria may emerge. The first is an equilibrium exhibiting the shadow value on the firing barrier at all times. In this equilibrium, hiring never takes place so that stationarity requires employment to be constant both across and within spells. In turn, wages fluctuate when business conditions change in order to peg the shadow value on the firing barrier. The second is an equilibrium exhibiting the shadow value on the hiring barrier in the first period of good spells and on the firing barrier in all other periods. In this equilibrium, firms hire if business conditions turn good from bad and fire at some other times. Due to its empirical relevance, in the remainder of the paper we focus on this second equilibrium and refer to it as the equilibrium with positive workforce adjustments.
Result 2
In an equilibrium with positive workforce adjustments, employment is constant during a spell of good business conditions while wages increase by H + F from the first to the second period of the spell and remain constant afterwards (proposition 4).
Result 3
In an equilibrium with positive workforce adjustments, firing takes place at all times during a spell of bad business conditions (proposition 5).
Result 2 conveys an insight developed in the insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988) . Once workers have been hired and become insiders, the union increases the wage by H + F , that is by the full replacement cost, without any sacrifice in terms of lower employment.
4 Result 3 is a consequence of the convexity of the firing aversion term in the union objective function. Once business conditions turn bad from good, the union calibrates the dynamics of wages so as to spread dismissals all over the expected duration of the bad spell.
Linear Labor Demand

Optimal strategies
We have characterized a Markov equilibrium where firms hire if business conditions turn good from bad and fire in the opposite case. Three main results have emerged. First, employment is constant during good spells. Second, during good spells the wage increases by the full replacement cost (F + H) from the first to the second period and remains constant until the end of the spell. Third, firing takes place in all periods during bad spells.
In this section we compute equilibrium strategies under a linear specification for the marginal revenue function. The gains from this restriction are the following. First, we obtain closed form solutions. Second, we may explicitly compute workforce turnover for the whole economy under the assumption that the distribution of industries across business states is ergodic. Thus, let marginal revenues be given by the following expression:
To solve the model, we need to compute w g and L g , the wage in the first period of a good spell and the corresponding employment level. Further, we need to compute the wage and the employment strategies during a bad spell, these must be respectively in the form w(b, L t 1 ) and l(b, l t 1, w t ). Let W g represent the expected discounted welfare for the union in the first period of a good spell. Since firms do not fire, W g does not depend on past employment. The union chooses w g by solving the following problem:
Equation 4 embeds the result that the wage increases by (F + H) from the second period until the end of the spell while employment remains constant at L g throughout the spell. Labor demand 5 is obtained by inserting the revenue function 3 in equation 1 and by recalling that, according to Result 1, the shadow value is equal to H in the current period and to F in the next period.
Notice that equation 5 suggests that employment in good times is reduced not only by hiring costs but also by firing costs. This property is also common in models of dynamic labor demand with exogenous wages. With respect to these models, however, a relevant di erence arises. With exogenous wages, firing costs a ect hiring decisions because firms anticipate the chance of a future business downturn and of a reversal of current recruits. For this reason, firing costs turn out to be weighted by the state reversion probability p. In the present context, instead, firms anticipate that firing costs bite in the next period even without any change in business conditions. This is because wages are endogenous and, if conditions remain good, insiders extract their rents by pushing firms onto the firing barrier. Thus, higher firing costs imply higher insider wages. This explains why, in equation 5, firing costs are not weighted by p.
Next, let W (b, L t 1 ) represent the expected discounted union welfare conditional on bad business conditions and past employment L t 1 , the wage w
As in the case of equation 5, labor demand 7 is obtained by substituting the revenue function 3 in equation 1 and by recalling that, according to Result 1, the shadow value lies on the firing barrier at current time while it moves to the hiring barrier in the next period only if business conditions turn good.
After inspecting labor demand 7 we make two observations. First, labor demand is sustained not only by firing costs but also by hiring costs. The e ect of firing costs is straightforward since firms are currently firing, the effect of hiring costs is more subtle as it follows from forward looking behavior. Firms anticipate that, with probability q, in the next period they might be constrained to reverse current firing decisions and to pay the corresponding cost. For this reason, they limit the amount of current firings. Second, lagged employment does not enter labor demand 7 as an explicit variable. This is because lagged employment determines current employment only under inaction.
Result 3, however, rules out inaction in the bad state.
5 For this reason, in the remainder of the paper the simpler notation l(b, w t ) is used in substitution of l(b, l t 1 , w t ).
Solution
In this subsection we turn our attention to the solution of the two Bellman problems and begin with the one defined by equations 4 and 5. We use the envelope theorem for derivatives involving continuation values and compute the f.o.c. for w g :
This equation, together with the expressions for L g and l(b, w t ) -equations 5 and 7 -and the wage w(b, L g ) which is to be set next period in case of a state reversion gives the solution for w g :
The wage rate charged by the union from the second to the last period of the spell is obtained by summing (H + F ) to w g . Since the last term in equation 9 is positive if > 0, we conclude that firing aversion does not play a role only in bad times but also in good times, even if in good times firing does not take place. Unions, in fact, behave in a forward looking fashion and try to limit future dismissals by limiting the number of current recruits. This is done by adding an extra positive component to the current wage. Equation 9 makes clear that this extra component increases with the probability of reverting to the bad state, with the parameter which captures the firing aversion and with the number of dismissals after a business downturn. By contrast, it decreases with the interest rate as future events are discounted more heavily.
The solution for w g is not yet fully specified as w(b, L t 1 ) is still unknown. For this purpose, we now focus on the problem defined by equations 6 and 7. We use the envelope theorem and derive the f.o.c. for w 5 This is a consequence of linear adjustment costs. If costs were quadratic, spreading the adjustment over many periods would imply a link between current and past employment.
Equation 10 
e w b 1 2
Since B = 0 when = 0, e w b represents the wage that the union would set in bad times in the absence of firing aversion.
Equations 5, 7, 9 and 11 provide the solution of the model and fully describe the path of employment and wages once the current state is assigned.
By substituting equation 11 in the labor demand l(b, w(b, L t 1 )) we find the level of employment with bad business conditions in period t as a function of the level of employment in period t 1. That is, we derive the employment dynamics within a spell of permanently bad business conditions:
Since 0 < dB < 1, at any time during bad spells the di erence between the current employment level and l(b, e w b ), the level which would arise with no firing aversion, is a fraction of its lagged value. This implies that l(b, e w b ) also represents the asymptotic steady state for the employment process in bad times. Furthermore, employment converges to the steady state from above since with strictly positive hiring and firing the sequence of equation 12 starts with a positive value L g l(b, w b ). In turn, decreasing employment and equae tion 11 imply that the wage in the bad state lies at all times below the level prevailing with = 0 and converges to the latter only asymptotically. Intuitively, in bad times the union keeps the wage below w b in order to contain the e number of dismissals, this parallels the finding on w g being increased by the aversion to firing. Furthermore, since aversion increases at the margin with the number of dismissals, e ciency requires dismissals to be spread over time instead of being squeezed in only one period. Thus, to induce small per-period workforce reductions, the wage undershoots the steady state level e w b in the first period of bad spells and moves gradually upwards in the direction of the steady state as bad conditions persist.
The degree of stickiness in the dynamics of employment and the measure of wage undershooting are both indexed by B, which is an increasing function of . Thus, stickiness and wage moderation increase if large workforce reductions become more costly to the union.
Existence
We have computed optimal strategies in an equilibrium where workforce is adjusted at positive rates after state reversions. In this section we study under what parameter restrictions such an equilibrium exists.
For ease of notation, let L b and w b represent employment and wage in the first period of bad spells, that is
By inserting L g as lagged employment in equations 12 and 11 we obtain, after some manipulations, an expression for w b in terms of the di erence (L g L b ):
Equation 9 makes clear that w g , the wage rate in the first period of good spells, is already expressed as a function of L g L b :
Thus, by inserting these wages in the corresponding labor demand equations 5 and 7, we may compute the di erence L g L b :
In equilibrium, firms adjust workforce at positive rates if L g > L b . Equation 15 suggests that a necessary and su cient condition for this to be the case is > 0. This restriction guarantees that an equilibrium with positive workforce adjustments exists. Intuitively, if the change in reference wages is negligible, firms hire and fire at positive rates if adjustment costs are not too high with respect to the change in productivity. Further, for given cost and productivity parameters, positive adjustments become more likely if state transition probabilities decrease. In fact, incentives to hire and fire increase if business conditions tend to be less volatile.
Equation 15 provides a hint about the two relevant mechanisms determining the contraction in employment after a business downturn. On the one hand, the change in employment decreases if adjustment costs increase for all levels of . On the other hand, since 0 ( ) > 0, the change in employment decreases with respect to for all levels of adjustment costs. Thus, workforce turnover is determined not only by adjustment costs, as it happens in models with exogenous wages, but also by the union concern to stabilize workforce in order to limit the number of dismissals.
The objective of stabilizing workforce is reached through sharp variations in wages across business states. To make this point clearer we will now look at the di erence between wage rates corresponding to employment levels L b and L g . Finding the wage that corresponds to L b is an easy task. Firms employ L b workers in the first period of bad spells and, during this period, the union charges the wage w b . Slightly more complicated is to find a unique wage level corresponding to L g as this employment level is maintained constant throughout the spell despite the union charges two di erent wage rates in the first and in all subsequent periods. It is obvious that neither of these two rates represents the per-period wage that firms expect to pay on average at the time they decide to employ L g . For this reason, we define the average wage during a good spell as that constant wage which equates the expected discounted flow of wages to the actual one. Expected discounted flows are computed from the beginning of the first period, that is at the time firms make the hiring decision. Let w g,AV represent this average, after some algebra we find:
with e w g = 1 2
he meaning of e w g parallels that of e w b as it represents the average wage during good spells in the absence of firing aversion. By inspecting the equations that define w g and e w b , one may notice that the di erence between these two e values is positive under the same parameter restriction that guarantees the existence of an equilibrium with positive workforce adjustments. Thus, the inequality > 0 also guarantees procyclical wages. After some manipulation, we find that the di erence between w g,AV and w b can be expressed as follows:
Since 0 ( ) > 0, wages tend to be more procyclical if the union becomes more averse to firing and, as a consequence, gives more weight to the objective of stabilizing workforce. As increases to infinity, the di erence between the two wage rates increases to its maximum /2 while workforce adjustments
Aggregate turnover and adjustment costs Aggregate Employment and Turnover
Up to this point we have studied the employment and wage dynamics of a single industry. Employment increases when business conditions improve and decreases when conditions worsen. During a spell of permanently good conditions employment remains stable whereas it slowly decreases during a spell of permanently bad conditions. The aim of this section is to characterize the aggregate employment turnover for an economy composed of many industries similar to the one just described and to check whether our theoretical results may provide some help in understanding OECD cross-section data on turnover rates. The main purpose of this section is to show that the preference for retention reduces the e ect of workforce adjustment costs on aggregate turnover rates.
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The economy is made of a unit mass of unionized industrial sectors of the kind analyzed above. All sectors are similar but idiosyncratic business conditions are independent across sectors. We assume that the economy began to operate long ago so that the initial distribution of sectors over the two business states has no bearing at present. Thus, by the law of large numbers, at any point in time a mass = q/(p + q) of firms (and sectors) enjoy good business conditions while a mass 1 are in bad business conditions. At the economy level only p firms move from the good to the bad state at any point in time and reduce employment by the amount L g L b . All those (1 )(1 q) firms that persist in the bad state reduce employment at a lower pace as the number of dismissals decreases with the duration of the spell at rate dB (see equation 12). By contrast, the decline of workforce in the bad state also implies that L g L b represents the lower bound for the number of workers that are hired by the (1 ) q firms that move from the bad to the good state at any point in time. Finally, at any point in time, (1 p) firms persist in the good state and do not operate any change in employment.
In spite of the complexity of employment flows, the distribution of firms across business states and employment levels is ergodic and can be easily computed due to the proportional nature of dynamics.
For given L g and L b , the expression for aggregate employment is
Intuitively, if workforce did not decline from the level L b in the bad state -that is if ( dB) = 0 -then aggregate employment would simply be the -weighted average of L g and L b . Since workforce does in fact decline at rate ( dB), aggregate employment lies below the weighted average. The e ect, however, is weakened by the constant exit rate from the bad state so that the number of firms with increasingly lower workforce is itself exponentially decreasing at rate q. This explains why ( dB) enters the formula compounded with (1 q).
An analogous intuition holds for aggregate turnover, that is the total number of recruits and dismissals which take place at any point in time:
In the absence of workforce reductions during bad spells, turnover is given by the number (L g L b ) of dismissals operated by each of the p firms su ering a business downturn plus the equal number of recruits operated by the p firms moving in the opposite direction. These two components are represented by the numerator of the expression. With workforce reductions during bad spells, the picture becomes more complicated. First, reductions contribute directly to the overall turnover. Second, the di erence (L g L b ) only gives the lower bound for workforce increments operated by hiring firms. Both channels increase turnover; their combined e ect is encapsulated in the multiplier 1/[1 (1 q)( dB)].
Computing Turnover Rates Figure 1a below illustrates the behavior of the ratio between aggregate turnover and aggregate employment for di erent values of F , H and and conditional on a set of baseline values for structural parameters. This ratio corresponds to the measure of "standardized" turnover adopted by the OECD (1994, 1996) to compare di erent countries. In the figure we use C as a compact measure of the size of adjustment costs H + F . In an attempt to catch some aspects of the real world we allow F to be the dominant component of these costs (see Bertola and Bentolila, 1990) : F = 0.8C and H = 0.2C. In this sense, an increase of C can be interpreted as a move towards stricter employment protection. The slope of the line corresponding to = 0 in fig.1a suggests that, in the absence of firing aversion, adjustment costs are particularly e ective in reducing turnover. By contrast, if increases to a positive value, the figure makes clear that turnover decreases for any size of adjustment costs so that adjustment costs become less relevant as a determinant of turnover. If is su ciently high, the relationship between turnover and adjustment costs becomes so weak that it could well escape empirical detection. This might be the reason for the absence of any cross country relationship between turnover and mandated turnover costs.
Results on turnover are matched by those on wages in figure 1b. For any level of adjustment costs, wage fluctuations increase with . On the other hand, for a given , wages fluctuate less if adjustment costs increase. Intuitively, for given adjustment costs, unions choose the best point along a dynamic trade-o whereby small employment fluctuations are paid in terms of excessive wage fluctuations which penalize current rents. If adjustment costs increase, the trade-o becomes more favorable because firms tend to stabilize employment on their own. Unions, in turn, use these more favorable terms to adopt a wage policy featuring less variability along the cycle.
The strength of these e ects depends on union preferences over the conflicting objectives represented by current rents and employment stability. With a large the concern for employment stability dominates and wages tend to fluctuate widely. As a consequence, a given trade-o improvement leads to a large reduction in wage fluctuations. By contrast, with a small rents represent the main concern and wages fluctuate in narrow bands; the same trade-o improvement generates a smaller reduction in wage fluctuations. In graphical terms, the relationship between wage changes and adjustment costs becomes steeper as increases whilst the relationship between turnover and adjustment costs becomes flatter.
An unexpected feature of figure 1b is the negative slope of the wage line when = 0 as, in this case, unions are not concerned with employment stability and adjustment costs should not a ect wage fluctuations. However, with = 0 the line represents the behavior of the di erence between w g and e e w b and the expressions that define these wage rates make it clear that the first decreases with adjustment costs while the second increases.
We observe that the negative slope of the wage line with = 0 does not represent a general feature of the model as it depends on the particular revenue function that has been used. In fact, we would have obtained a positive slope for this line if we had used a log-linear instead of a linear marginal revenue function.
The slope of the line corresponding to = 0 in figure 1b is a consequence of adjustment costs a ecting the elasticity of labor demand. With good business conditions, adjustment costs shift labor demand to the left in the w, L spacesee equation 5 -so that demand elasticity increases for any wage level. Higher elasticity, in turn, reduces w g by reducing the mark-up imposed by the union e over reference wages. By contrast, during bad business conditions, adjustment costs shift labor demand to the right -see equation 7 -and the e ect on the elasticity and the wage w b turns out to be the opposite. With a log-linear e expression, adjustment costs not only a ect the position of labor demand in the two business states but also the slope. Elasticity e ects are reversed so that, when adjustment costs increase, the union tends to charge higher wages in the good state and lower wages in the bad state.
In any case, since our argument is based on union aversion to firing, the slope of the wage line in the absence of such aversion has been discussed only for the purpose of completeness. When is positive the union desires employment stability and wages become more responsive to business conditions. For a su ciently high the preference for employment stability becomes so strong that the slope of the wage line becomes positive in the log-linear case as well.
8
The positive relationship between and the slope of the wage line is thus a general feature of the model. Finally, we would like to discuss how job protection a ects employment, wages and the welfare of unions for di erent values of . If = 0 the model collapses to the standard case analyzed in the literature on dynamic labor demand with the di erence that wages are set by a union instead of being fixed at some exogenous level. For the above baseline parameters, computations show that as C increases employment and wages decrease in the good state and increase in the bad state. Accordingly, the flow utility of the union increases in the bad state and decreases in the good state. When we compute cross-section averages for the whole economy we notice that the average welfare of unions decreases despite a slight increase in average employment and average wages.
9
That the welfare of the union turns out to be decreased by stricter employment protection when = 0 should come at no surprise. The union, in fact, is a monopolist and targets part of the rents accruing to the firm from the productivity of inframarginal labor units. Higher wages transfer rents from the firm to the union albeit at the cost of a lower employment level. From the vantage point o ered by these remarks we can easily understand the negative impact of adjustment costs on union welfare. Adjustment costs, in fact, drive a wedge between the marginal product of labor and the wage causing a reduction in overall rents and, henceforth, a reduction in those rents that are captured by the union.
The negative impact of employment protection on union welfare with = 0 provides a further angle to the view taken in this paper. This result implies that, in the absence of any concern for retention, the union should oppose all provisions that reduce the profitability of firms. Thus, to account for the union support of strict employment protection one needs to add some sort of preference for employment stability. In terms of the present model, under baseline parameters, if C increases from 0 to 0.5 the average union welfare increases by 4.4% if = 0.5 and by 8, 9% if = 5. Further, since adjustment costs stabilize employment across business states and reduce wage movements at business changes, there is no reason to expect wide variations in their average in response to the above increase in C. This is confirmed by computations: when = 0.5, for instance, average employment increases by 1% and average wages by 2%.
9 When C increases from 0 to 0.5 (a value slightly below the no-adjustments threshold), average employment and average wages increase by 2% while average union welfare decreases by 7.1%. The loss in flow-utility during a good spell overcomes the gain during a bad spell.
Discussion
The analysis suggests that firing and hiring costs may not be so relevant in determining employment turnover since the underlying quest for more employment stability can be partly satisfied through union policies leading to more cyclical wages at firm or sector levels. This provides a potential explanation for the stylized fact whereby economies with much di erent regimes of employment protection exhibit quite similar turnover patterns.
10 Table 1 below presents descriptive evidence from a number of OECD countries on turnover and employment protection and econometric evidence on firm/sector wage elasticity with respect to a measure of idiosyncratic business conditions.
The first column gives the OECD measure for the stringency of Epl in each country and represents the "most widely used indicator in the empirical literature".
11 The second column presents the average job turnover rate for continuing establishments (OECD, 1996) , which we regard as the empirical counterpart of our measure of job turnover depicted in figure 1a . Finally, the third column reports results from a number of studies that have attempted to estimate the reaction of wages to industry specific shocks hitting the average value of labor.
12
The picture emerging from the table is clear and consistent with theoretical results. Employment turnover changes across countries with no relation to employment protection 13 . On the other hand, wage elasticity to idiosyncratic conditions appears to increase if one moves from high to low protection countries. Nickell and Nunziata (2000) use the same evidence on wage elasticity reported in table 1 and informally argue that the negative correlation between wage elasticity at firm level and Epl may be the reason for the absence of any empirical relationship between Epl and job turnover.
14 10 For an analysis on how di erent labor market institutions a ect the short and long term reaction of economies to aggregate shocks, see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) .
11 See Addison and Teixeira (2001) , who also discuss a number of problems linked to the "scoring and weighting" procedure used to compute such an indicator.
12 Unfortunately, studies on short-run wage dynamics at firm or industrial level are rare. By contrast, many studies have focused instead upon aggregate wage dynamics with respect to economy-wide fluctuations. In general, the latter have not found any link between Epl and aggregate wage elasticity. This finding, however, is by no means at odds with our argument. Countries with similar patterns of aggregate wage elasticity may easily exhibit sharp di erences in wage elasticity at firm/industry level.
13 The OECD (1999) adds New Zealand and Japan to the groups of countries listed in table 1 and finds that the correlation between the Epl indicator and the job turnover measure is not significant.
14 "...There is some evidence that this [i.e. With a competitive labor market, the pattern exhibited by the table may only arise in rather special circumstances. In particular, one needs to assume that workers who move across sectors are subject to mobility costs and that these costs are negatively correlated across countries with employment protection. Without mobility costs, equilibrium wages would not change between good and bad firms as workers freely move to accommodate changes in business conditions. With mobility costs, instead, expanding firms need to pay a positive wage di erential if they want to attract new workers. Thus, countries with high mobility costs -and, by assumption, low job protection -are also those with high wage elasticity to business conditions. In these circumstances, turnover would be constant across countries since the e ect of adjustment costs in high protection countries is counteracted by low mobility costs.
The focus on the role of mobility costs certainly contributes to our understanding of labor market flows. Yet, assuming that these costs are negatively correlated with employment protection is unwarranted. Rather, a comparison between Europe and the USA points to the opposite conclusion as Epl and mobility costs appear to be positively correlated in the real world.
to the fact that low levels of employment protection tend to be associated with high levels of intra-firm wage flexibility... " Nickell and Nunziata (2000) , pag. 11. Italics added by the author.
Faced with evidence similar to that in table 1, Bertola and Rogerson avoid equilibrium explanations and suggest that the role of employment protection should be considered jointly with that of other market institutions, which differ from one country to the other. This paper takes a di erent perspective. We maintain employment protection as the only source of heterogeneity among countries. Nevertheless, we are able to derive theoretical results largely consistent with cross-country evidence on wage flexibility and employment turnover. We obtain this result by assuming non-competitive wage setting and union aversion to dismissals. In the remainder of this section we discuss these two features by making some comparison with other related works.
In retrospect, our framework may be regarded as a combination of a labor demand settingà la Bertola and a dynamic union monopoly model of the kind used by Kennan (1988) or, more recently, by Modesto and Thomas (2001) . The main di erence with these papers relates to the assumption on union preference for workforce stabilization in addition to the usual objective represented by some functional combination of employment and wages. This is obtained by summing to a traditional utilitarian function (Oswald, 1985) a quadratic term of the kind frequently used in the insider-outsider literature. However, while in this literature any di erence between current employment and membership (i.e. lagged employment) is assumed to be costly to the union, no matter whether the di erence is positive due to new recruits or negative due to dismissals, in the present paper we only allow for costly workforce reductions.
It is true that, in the model, unions also oppose workforce expansions by setting very high wages in good times but this sort of hiring aversion is not imposed exogenously. Rather, it arises endogenously from the assumption of a two state stochastic cycle coupled with forward-looking behavior of unions.
If Epl is directed to provide employment insurance, it seems quite natural to introduce union preference for employment retention. In our model, with no such preference, unions experience a welfare loss from workforce adjustment costs. Further, casual observation and empirical analysis suggest that unions use their political influence to maintain and enhance protection (Checchi and Lucifora, 2002 ). Yet, Modesto and Thomas provide an argument whereby unions seem to benefit from adjustment costs even in the absence of firing aversion. This happens because, in their framework, workforce adjustment costs are quadratic so that current employment depends on its lagged value. This reduces short term labor demand elasticity and, implicitly, enhances short term monopolistic power in wage-setting. However, the analysis on the long term welfare e ects is not provided. One should also notice that empirical investigations on firm microdata have rejected the quadratic specification of adjustment costs.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented a game between a unique wage-setting union and many competitive firms belonging to the same industry. Firms are subject to workforce linear adjustment costs and stochastic changes in their economic environment. The union, apart from sectorial employment and wages, is also interested in preserving the occupation for those who are currently employed. The main result of the model is that adjustment costs reduce job turnover rates. The e ect may however be weak and, in any case, weaker than it may be expected on the basis of previous models of dynamic labor demand featuring exogenous wages.
Unions, in fact, use their influence in wage bargaining to protect the occupation of those who are currently employed. Workforce stabilization is obtained through wages which over-react to changes in business conditions. In this context Epl merely acts as a device which makes it easier for the union to reach the goal of employment stabilization. As Epl becomes more severe, firms tend to reduce workforce flows on their own and unions shift the target of their policy from employment stabilization to rent maximization.
On empirical grounds the model predicts a negative cross-country correlation between the strictness of Epl and the elasticity of wages to idiosyncratic business conditions and, for a su ciently high aversion to firings, a small or negligible negative correlation between Epl and the aggregate rate of job turnover. The prediction about wage flexibility is consistent with the data. The prediction about job turnover provides a potential explanation for the lack of empirical evidence on the expected negative link between turnover and Epl.
Proposition 1
In a Markov equilibrium, the shadow value lies on the firing barrier if employment does not change from the previous period.
Proof: Let the current state be (j, L t 1 ) and assume that in this state employment does not change from the previous level. Since inaction emerges as an equilibrium outcome, the shadow value S computed by positing current employment equal to its previous level is contained within the closed interval [ F, H] .
To prove the proposition it is su cient to notice that S decreases with respect to the current wage and that the union has an incentive to increase the wage at least up to the point S reaches the value F . In fact, if S ( F, H] the union could increase the wage by a small amount without paying any cost in terms of lower current employment and, since employment is a state variable in a Markov game, without any cost in terms of worse future payo s.¤
Corollary 1
In a Markov equilibrium, the shadow value can only lie on the hiring barrier or on the firing barrier.
Proof : By contradiction. If the shadow value were internal to the open interval ( F, H) then, by the optimal hiring and firing policy discussed in section 2.2, employed workforce would not change from the level in the previous period. But, in this case, proposition 1 states that the shadow value must be equal to F .¤
Proposition 2
In a Markov equilibrium, the shadow value moves from the hiring to the firing barrier if business conditions do not change.
Proof:
The proof is twofold. First, we prove that the shadow value cannot lie continuously on the hiring barrier from period t to period t + n -with n > 1 -within the same spell of business conditions. Second, we prove that the shadow value cannot lie on the hiring barrier in periods t and t + 1. By corollary 1, this implies that, if the shadow value is on the hiring barrier in period t, it moves to the firing barrier in period t + 1. In both cases the proof is made by contradiction.
Let business conditions in period t be indexed by j and assume that an equilibrium exists featuring the shadow value on the hiring barrier from period t to period t + n.
In this equilibrium, the problem facing the union would be the same in any period from t to t + n 1:
If the problem is the same, the same wage and employment levels are replicated from t to t+n 1. As a consequence, by proposition 1, the shadow value must lie on the firing barrier, not on the hiring barrier. Therefore, a contradiction arises. Suppose next that the shadow value lies on the hiring barrier in periods t and t + 1 and on the firing barrier in period t + 2. By proposition 1, this implies that the employment level in period t + 1 is strictly higher than the one in the period t. In this case the problem facing the union in period t is equal to one presented in equations 18 whereas the problem at the beginning of period t + 1 reads as follows:
The two problems exhibit only one di erence. If business conditions do not change, in the next period the shadow value is equal to H in problem 18 and to F in problem 19.
We make three observations: 1) Problems 18 and 19 present the same objective function. In the w,l space, the constraint in problem 19 is a downward shift with respect to the constraint in problem 18. The size of the shift is 1 1+r
(1 s j ) (F + H). 2) Firms are atomistic and regard aggregate employment as exogenous. Formally this implies dL 0 /dl 0 = 0. The function S(j 1 , l, w(j 1 , L)) is therefore not increasing with respect to l (see equation 2 in the main text). This fact, coupled with R ll ( j , l) < 0, implies that the constraint in each problem is a monotonically decreasing schedule in the w,l space.
3) Indi erence curves become flatter as one moves downwards in the w,l space, i.e. if the wage decreases while employment is kept constant.
Let (w , L ) represent the solution to problem 18. By observation 1, the point ¡ w 1 1+r
(1 s j ) (F + H) , L ¢ is located on the constraint of problem 19. Observations 2 and 3 imply that at this point the indi erence curve is flatter than the constraint. Thus, the union does not choose a point on the constraint exhibiting a level of employment higher than L . Once again, a contradiction arises.¤
Proposition 3
In a Markov equilibrium, the shadow value does not move from the firing to the hiring barrier if business conditions do not change.
Proof : The proof is conducted by contradiction. Suppose that an equilibrium exists exhibiting the shadow value on the firing barrier at time t and on the hiring barrier at time t + 1 with constant business condition j in both periods and lagged employment given by L t 1 . By proposition 1, in this equilibrium, employment strictly increases from period t to period t + 1.
The wage and employment levels in period t are determined by solving the following problem:
Notice that, by construction, the current shadow value is equal to F while in the next period, if business condition j persists, it is equal to H. Since current employment may be lower than the previous level, the objective function exhibits the corresponding negative term due to the aversion towards firing.
The wage and employment levels in period t + 1 are determined by solving the problem:
The current shadow value is equal to H by construction while next period, in case business condition j persists, it is equal to F by proposition 2.
We make three observations: 1) In the w,l space, the constraint in problem 21 is a downward shift with respect to the constraint in problem 20. The size of the shift is (1 + 1 s j 1+r
) (F + H).
2) The constraint in each problem is monotonically decreasing in the w,l space. See the argument in the proof of proposition 2.
3) Indi erence curves for both objective functions become flatter as one moves downwards in the w,l space, i.e. if the wage decreases while employment is kept constant. Indi erence curves for problem 20 also present a kink when current employment is equal to the lagged value L t 1 . Curves become steeper by a discrete amount when current employment moves from the right to the left of L t 1 . Further, since the shadow value is on the firing barrier by construction current employment cannot be higher than L t 1 so that the solution of problem 20 lies on the steep portion of the relevant indi erence curve.
Let (w , L ) represent the solution to problem 20. By observation 1, point
´i s located on the constraint of problem 21. Observations 2 and 3 imply that at this point the indi erence curve is flatter than the constraint. Thus, the solution to problem 21 cannot feature employment strictly higher than L . A contradiction arises.¤
Proposition 4
In a Markov equilibrium with positive workforce adjustments, during a spell of good business conditions: a) employment does not change from the first to the second period of the spell; b) the wage increases by H + F from the first to the second period of the spell; c) employment and wages remain constant from the second period onwards.
proof: Let L g be the employment level in the first period of a good spell and L 0 g the employment level in the second period. Notice that L 0 g > L g is ruled out by the definition of an equilibrium with positive workforce adjustment. In fact, in this equilibrium the shadow value lies on the hiring barrier only in the first period of a good spell (see discussion in section 2.3). Thus, suppose assertion a) is not true, that is suppose in the second period firms fire even if conditions remain good: L 0 g < L g . Let W g represent the equilibrium welfare for the union in the first period and W (g, L t 1 ) the welfare function from the second period onwards. The short notation for the welfare in the first period is due to the fact that positive hiring implies that past employment is irrelevant.
The first period wage w g is chosen as follows:
The constraint is explained as follows. Since firms hire by assumption, the current shadow value is equal to H. In the next period, in an equilibrium with positive workforce adjustments, the shadow value is equal to F in both states.
The second period wage w 0 g is chosen as follows:
The constraint is explained as follows. Since firms fire by assumption, the current shadow value is equal to F . As for the problem above, next period, the shadow value is also equal to F in both states.
We make three observations. 1) In both problems the constraint is a smooth downward sloping labor demand schedule in the w, L space. The schedule in problem 23 is an F + H upward shift with respect to the one in problem 22.
2) Indi erence curves in both problems become steeper in the w, L space if one moves upwards, i.e. if one increases the wage while keeping the employment constant.
3) Indi erence curves in problem 23 present a kink at L 0 g = L g , the slope increase as one moves from the right to the left of the kink.
Let (w , L ) represent the solution to problem 22 The point [w + (H + F ), L ] is located on the labor demand of problem 23. In this point the indi erence curve is steeper than labor demand not only on the left of L but also on the right. Thus, the union has no incentive to enforce a solution with L 0 g < L g . This ends the proof of point a).
If employment does not change from the first to the second period, it follows that the shift in labor demand only a ects wages, that is:
This ends the proof of point b).
Finally, notice that in the third period of a good spell the union inherits employment L g and is faced with the same problem arising in the second period (i.e. problem 23). Thus, the wage and employment level of the second period are replicated in the third period and, by induction, in all other periods. This ends the proof of point c).¤
Proposition 5
In a Markov equilibrium with positive workforce adjustments, firms fire at positive rates in all periods of a bad spell.
The proof establishes that during bad spells if firms fire in a given period they also fire in the next period. Since firms fire in the first period of the spell this is su cient to prove the proposition.
The proof is conducted by contradiction. Let L t 1 (= l t 1 ) represent past employment and suppose that w(b, L t 1 ) = e w and w(b, L ) = w represent equilibrium wages and L = L(b, l t 1 , w) = L(b, L , w ) equilibrium aggregate e employment. Further, assume that L t 1 > L . Thus, along this equilibrium path, with permanently bad business conditions, firing takes place at time t but from the next period onwards employment remains stable at L .
By definition of equilibrium, employment and wage decisions must be mutual best responses. This implies that the choice of L at time t satisfies the following relationship:
Given the wage w firms fire until the shadow value reaches the barrier F . Noe tice that, in the next period, positive adjustments imply that the shadow value is equal to H if business conditions revert and to F if business conditions remain bad and firms continue to employ L workers.
Since L is also optimal in period t + 1 with wage w and with persisting bad business conditions, the following must also be true:
The last two equations imply that the two wage rates must be equal:
Knowing that in the next period wage and employment replicate current values if business conditions persist in the bad state, at the beginning of period t the union chooses e w by solving the following problem:
s.t. 24
In turn, at the beginning of period t + 1 the union chooses w by solving the following problem:
s.t. 25
Observe that the two problems are formally subject to the same constraint and would have the same solution -as dictated by equation 26 -only if the indi erence curves of the two objective functions had the same shape. Due to the convex (quadratic) term that conveys the aversion to firings this is true if and only if L t 1 = L . This contradicts the assumption L t 1 > L .¤ Teulings C. and Hartog J. (1998), Wages and Labour Market Institutions in International Comparison, in Internal Labor Markets, Incentives and Employment, 1998, 19-48. 
